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The book consists of thirteen studies examining different aspects of human 
life protection in the early stage of its development. The contributions are 
arranged in three parts. Part I focuses on theoretical problems and examines the 
main issues of contemporary jurisprudence. The foundation of human rights, 
different approaches to sovereignty, the relation between law and science, the 
legitimacy of judicial power, and the nature of legal authority are discussed. 
Part II presents the issues within the national contexts of the USA, Germany, 
Austria and Poland. In a wider perspective, Part III examines the issue of the 
protection of human life in the prenatal phase on three different levels: within 
the EU, within the European Court of Human Rights case law and the UN 
system.
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Eugenics as a Human Right
José Miguel Serrano Ruiz-Calderón*
The European Court of Human Rights (ECHR) was established as the main in-
strument for the implementation of the Convention intended to protect human 
rights. This Court has spoken out against Italy with a very brief statement of 
grounds at the request of two residents in this State: Rosetta Costa and M. Walter 
Pavan.1 Both were carriers of a genetic disease and both wanted access to medi-
cally assisted procreation in order to prevent the transmission of a genetic disease 
by preimplantation embryo selection.
The Italian Law 40, known as the Assisted Reproduction Law, prohibits eu-
genic practices, in particular embryo selection. The European Court of Human 
Rights noticed a contradiction between the Law 40 and Law 194 which allows so-
called “therapeutic abortion”. In fact the couple had previously agreed to abortion 
based on this legislative justification. They did so after the fetus was found to be 
affected with a disease through prenatal diagnosis, being currently the most wide-
spread instrument to prevent birth,2 as the killing of a child with a disability dis-
covered in the prenatal stage of its development is often euphemistically called. 
The Court based its judgment on the contradiction found in the Italian legisla-
tion. This contradiction was a violation of Article 8 of the European Convention 
for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, which states that 
everyone has the right to the protection of his/her privacy and family life. It seems 
that in principle this article has nothing to do strictly with the application of limits 
on embryo selection in IVF, and in fact the Court had ruled so, considering that 
the prohibition of heterologous fertilization called by Austria did not limit per-
sonal or family life. Indeed at that time the Grand Chamber still accepted that the 
interference of Article 8 does not refer exclusively to a negative duty of the State 
but also implies a positive duty to promote that life, insisting that the Court’s aim 
* Professor at the Department of Jurisprudence in the Law School of Complutense Univer-
sity. Member of the Pontificia Academia Pro Vita. Academic Director of the Instituto de 
Estudios Bursatiles. jmruizcalderon@gmail.com
1 Costa et Pavan c. Italie, 28.08.2012 (Requête no 54270/10).
2 N.López Moratalla, M. Lago Fernández Purón, E. Santiago, Selección de embriones hu-
manos. Diagnóstico Genético Preimplantación comparado, Cuadernos de Bioética, vol. 
XXII, Nr 75/2011.
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is not to replace the State’s margin of appreciation when legislating on assisted 
fertilization.3
As to the scope of the margin of appreciation which belongs to states in mat-
ters concerning medically assisted procreation, in S.H. et autres c. Autriche the 
Grand Chamber made a very important and particularly relevant statement. Un-
fortunately, it was ignored by the Second Section in Costa and Pavan v. Italy. The 
Grand Chamber of the ECHR emphasized the complexity of proper assessment of 
the breadth of the margin of appreciation to be enjoyed by the State when deciding 
any case under Article 8 of the Convention. As pointed out in that case, “there is 
no consensus within the Member States of the Council of Europe, either as to the 
relative importance of the interest at stake or as to the best means of protecting 
it, particularly where the case raises sensitive moral or ethical issues, the margin 
will be wider, as the State authorities are, in principle, in a better position than 
the international judge to give an opinion, not only on the ‘exact content of the 
requirements of morals’ in their country, but also on the necessity of a restriction 
intended to meet them. A wide margin of appreciation will also be accorded if 
striking a balance between competing private and public interests or Convention 
rights is in question.” Then the Court observed that according to a comparative 
survey available to the Court, in the field of assisted procreation a large variety 
of legal solutions might be observed and for that reason, the State’s margin of ap-
preciation is not to be narrowed.4
Unfortunately, this statement by the Grand Chamber was totally disregarded 
by the Second Section in Costa and Pavan, where a totally opposite approach 
seems to have been taken. It narrowed this margin of appreciation very much in 
relation to PID and to some extent it also limited the margin in relation to IVF 
legislation.5 The hythesis that we hold in this paper is that this second judgment is 
3 S.H. et autres c. Autriche [GC], no 57813/00, § 82.
4 S.H. et autres c. Autriche [GC], no 57813/00, § 94-96.
5 “As it was pointed out by the European Center for Law and Justice: L’article 8 a essentiel-
lement pour objet de protéger les individus contre les ingérences arbitraires des autorités 
publiques. La Cour l’a rappelé dans l’arrêt du 1er avril 2010, en précisant que « la notion 
de « vie privée » au sens de l’article 8 de la Convention est une notion large qui englobe, 
entre autres, . . . le droit au respect des décisions de devenir ou de ne pas devenir parent 
. . . Le droit au respect crée, pour l’Etat, une obligation de s’abstenir d’intervenir dans la 
décision du couple. L’Etat ne doit pas forcer la volonté des parents, par exemple en faisant 
procéder à des contraceptions, stérilisations ou avortements forcés, ou en imposant des 
charges fiscales dissuasives à chaque nouvelle naissance comme c’est le cas en Chine.” 
Observations en Tierce Intervention soumises à la Grande Chambre de la Cour européenne 
des Droits de l’homme dans l’affaire S.H. et autres c. Autriche (Requête no 57813/00).
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to some extent a kind of reconstruction of the American decision in Roe v. Wade6 
and that the Court unlawfully imposed eugenic practice7 at the European level on 
the grounds of respect for personal and family life – a right which is construed in 
a similar way to the U.S. right to privacy.8
Eugenics and human rights
Originally eugenics was a discipline strongly dependent on Social Darwinism. It 
appeared in this sense in the work of Francis Galton. The objective was to keep the 
struggle for survival in human society, to preserve the advantages of natural selec-
tion thanks to new, artificial means in modern societies regardless of the serious 
limitation of this struggle.9 Effectively it was nothing more but the old prejudices 
on responsibility for the poor, disguised by a so-called scientific hypothesis.10
The concern of eugenics has always been to improve mankind through the 
application of science. This is true both of its negative aspects (selection by elimi-
nation of the defective) as well as in its positive ones (selection of the fittest for 
reproduction, or when this was made possible, of those who were believed to have 
positive features). 
The methods of eugenics in the first instance focused on the denial of re-
productive capacity to those who were not able to fulfill the social standards as 
understood by the promoters of eugenics. This limitation was racially motivated 
or based on pseudoscientific observations, such as the belief that a person inherits 
certain moral properties of. Even very respectable courts which created especially 
relevant jurisprudence for the protection of individual and social rights, such as 
the U.S. Supreme Court, pronounced in an openly eugenic way. Particularly note-
worthy in this respect is the famous judgment delivered by a judge as eminent as 
Oliver Wendell Holmes, who delivered the famous statement in the Buck v. Bell 
case: “It is better for the whole world, if instead of waiting to execute degener-
ate offspring for crime, or to let them starve for their imbecility, society can pre-
6 US Supreme Court 410 U.S. 113 Roe v. Wade appeal from the united states district court 
for the northern district of Texas No. 70-18 Argued: December 13, 1971 Decided: January 
22, 1973.
7 In Spain see: E. Rodríguez Martín, Eugenics’ extension in the Spanish health care system 
through the prenatal diagnosis, Cuadernos de Bioética” XXIII, 2012/1ª p 53; also: J. Vi-
larroig Martín, The silent disappearance: report of screening eugenics of people with down 
syndrome, Cuadernos de Bioética XXIII, 2012/1ª , p 111.
8 J. Finnis, The value of human life and the right to die: some reflections on Cruzan and 
Ronald Dworkin, Southern Illinois Law Journal, Vol. 17, num III, ULJCm 1992-1993.
9 J. M. Serrano, Retos jurídicos de la bioética, Madrid 2005.
10 Fr. Galton, Herencia y Eugenesia, Madrid 1988.
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vent those who are manifestly unfit from continuing their kind. The principle that 
sustains compulsory vaccination is broad enough to cover cutting the Fallopian 
tubes. (Jacobson v. Massachusetts, 197 U.S. 11, 25 S. Ct. 358, 3 Ann. Cas. 765). 
Three generations of imbeciles are enough.”11
In immigration countries eugenists were also concerned with the selection 
of immigrants for alleged eugenic reasons.12 This happened in the United States 
as well, as is known in the overtly racist immigration laws. Thus the legislation 
signed by President Coolidge,13 including the National Origins Act, and the Asian 
Exclusion Act,14 was a United States federal law that limited the annual quota of 
immigrants who could be admitted from any country to 2% of the number of peo-
ple from that country who were already living in the United States in 1890; and it 
was diminished from the earlier 3% set up by the Immigration Restriction Act of 
1921. These regulations completely banned Asian immigration.
However, abortion was the field where eugenics was probably most openly 
based on social prejudice. Here, the hypothesis followed a Malthusian-tailored 
principle, which considered that higher reproductive propensity from lower class-
es was negatively affecting genetic heritage.15 The promotion of abortion among 
women of this social class was therefore a core eugenics objective. This resulted 
in efforts undertaken by eugenists to legalize abortion, as Anne Farmer has dem-
onstrated in her invaluable book.16 Interestingly, in countries where racial preju-
dice rather than social prejudice was the predominant discrimination, abortion 
was less accessible or not available at all to the racially “healthy” population of 
whatever social status, but encouraged in ethnic groups labeled as “sick,” “lower” 
or “parasites”, to follow some of the terminology of that time.17
This brief introduction is intended to recall that eugenics is the foundation of 
some of the biggest attacks on human rights, attacks which were to be countered 
by the creation of the Council of Europe and its system of guarantees, with the 
European Convention in the first place resulting in the establishment of the Euro-
pean Court of Human Rights.
11 Buck v. Bell, 274 U.S. 200 (1927) at 208.
12 M. Grant , The passing of the great race or The racial basis of the European history, Ayer 
1970. 
13 The Immigration Act of 1924 (The Johnson-Reed Act).
14 Pub.L. 68-139, 43 Stat. 153, enacted May 26, 1924.
15 A. Pichot, La Société pure. De Darwin á Hitler, Paris, 2001.
16 See: A. Farmer, By their fruits: eugenics, population control, and the abortion campaign, 
sine loco 2008.
17 See: J.M. Serrano, El aborto, de la mano de la eugenesia. La investigación histórica de 
Ann Farmer muestra que en su origen el aborto y la esterilización se promovieron como 
medidas eugenésicas contra los pobres, http://eprints.ucm.es/11744/1/El_aborto_by_
their_fruits_arreglado.pdf.
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It is in this context that we must analyze the alleged scandal that the ECtHR 
found Italy liable for: the breach of the ECHR by having limited the most ag-
gressive eugenic practice, namely preimplantation genetic diagnosis (PGD) for in 
vitro fertilization, by its Law 40.
A serious contradiction within common European legal culture
This paradox is particularly acute, as the majority of European states belong-
ing both to the European Union and to the Council of Europe were exposed in 
the same year to an instance of embryo protective jurisprudence in the famous 
sentence Brüstle v. Greenpeace delivered by the Grand Chamber of the Court of 
Justice of the EU, and on the other hand, to the Costa-Pavan Judgment v. Italy by 
the European Court of Human Rights, which established a de facto compulsory 
eugenic “option” in assisted reproduction laws.
It is worth recalling the most important data on embryo valuation in the Eu-
ropean Union case law. 
On 18 October 2011 the Court of Justice of the European Union delivered 
an important interpretation of Directive 98/44 EC on the legal protection of bio-
technological inventions. It was the preliminary judgment in the Brüstle v. Green-
peace case, referred to the CJEU by the German Supreme Administration Court 
for the determination of the scope of patentability exclusion for the human body, 
as provided by Directive 98/44 EC. The court decided that this exclusion covers 
all the stages of human development including germinal cells, and that the iden-
tification of just one of its elements or one of its products, including the sequence 
or partial sequence of a human gene, excluded a “product” from patentability. For 
this purpose the Court determined the concept of the “non-patentable embryo,” 
common to all European countries. This is a broad concept of the embryo, that 
only for that purpose, differs from the prevailing interpretation in the British or 
Spanish legislation, and comes closer to the current concept in German law.18
The reasons to support the developing embryo by means of protective legisla-
tion are evident to many scholars.19 This legislation is being implemented progres-
sively at the European level, but there are some contradictions to be resolved if we 
want to promote embryo protection. Recently Justo Aznar, a Spanish bioethicist, 
18 For detailed analysis of the issue see: Id., Dignidad versus patentabilidad (Comentario de 
la STJ 18 de octubre de 2011 en el asunto Brüstle/ Greenpeace,. La Ley. Revista jurídica 
española de doctrina, jurisprudencia y bibliografía , Nº 7766, Sección Tribuna, 30 Dic. 
2011, Año XXXII . pp. 4-7. 
19 See: M. Livio, Estatuto ético del embrión humano: estatuto biológico, antropológico y 
jurídico, Madrid, 1999.
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has stressed the relationship between the biological and legal status of the human 
embryo. The foundation of its human rights must be built upon its biological real-
ity. The claim that we have to justify is that the early embryo is a living human be-
ing belonging to our species, a human individual, and not a lump of cells without 
a biological structure.20
The most important argument is the embryo’s genetic identity. The genome 
of the zygote already contains all the genetic information necessary for that new 
being to develop fully into a living adult being. As Justo Aznar states, the genetic 
identity of the new individual and its membership of a particular species has al-
ready been determined in the process of conception. The evolution of that being is 
a continuous biological process resulting in the different realities of its develop-
ment in the course of its life, identifying it as a living human being, from the fer-
tilisation of the egg by the sperm until its natural death. However, there are many 
more biological arguments to support the argument that a human individual is 
something more than just its genetic code. We now have much more information 
about the non-genetic mechanisms that significantly influence embryo develop-
ment. Every phenotype expression of a living being is the result of the gene con-
tent of its genome and the epigenetic information that is generated throughout its 
evolution, as a fundamental consequence of the interaction of the genome with its 
environment. If those scientific data are not acknowledged in a clear way, then any 
vagueness will lead to a vague approach taken in the construction of the general 
legal principles as well as in the ethical guidelines relating to the human embryo. 
“It is not possible to build a well-founded bioethics if it is not consolidated with a 
good foundation in biology based on verified data and the careful examination of 
the information and ideas which must be considered to resolve these problems.” 21
There are further biological mechanisms which support the position that the 
early human embryo cannot be considered merely as a lump of cells, but as an 
organised living human being. These include mechanisms that regulate the emis-
sion of the embryo’s development program; the so-called position information; 
the role played by the fusion of the cell membranes of both gametes in starting up 
the process of the embryo’s development, and the determination of the asymme-
try and polarity of the zygote; various biochemical factors, mainly the intra- and 
extracellular calcium levels, which can directly influence embryo development; 
the genetic regulation of the cell differentiation mechanisms; the biochemical dia-
logue established between the embryo and its mother during its existence in the 
Fallopian tube; and finally the inhibition of the mother’s immune response. 
20 In extenso: Estatuto Biológico del embrión. Desarrollo embrionario. Ataques a la vida 
humana naciente, Informe del Observatorio de Bioética de la UCAV, http://observatorio-
bioetica.com/embriones-humanos/estatuto-biologico-desarrollo-embrionario/.
21 G. Herranz, El embrión ficticio. Historia de un mito biológico, Madrid: Palabra 2013, p 9.
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Implantation diagnosis, prenatal diagnosis and eugenic abortion
The eugenic route in assisted reproduction laws first appear to be associated with 
preimplantation diagnosis (PID), then with prenatal diagnosis (PSC) and finally 
manifested in so-called eugenic abortion. It might be worth highlighting some 
aspects of eugenic abortion that could be useful in the analysis of the Costa and 
Pavan case.
In the German, and, to some extent, also in the Spanish jurisprudence, the aim 
of the selection of a healthy child and the subsequent destruction of those who are 
defective, is concealed under a doctrine tolerating prima facie criminal conduct 
in order to defend another legally protected value. According to this approach, 
it is burdensome to impose a penalty on a person beset by problems revealed in 
prenatal diagnosis. No penalty, but also, no right to abortion. Still it seems that the 
right to abortion is denied in theory rather than in practice. This was of particular 
concern to the German Federal Constitutional Court: what Germany wanted was a 
eugenic policy. In other words, the eugenics-based exception to general protection 
of the unborn child was explained as being not so much the right to have a perfect 
child but rather the benefit of granting no penalty for an act which is basically not 
accepted by the law.22 
The context of the debate on the legal status of the embryo
Another issue that may not be disregarded in an analysis of the legislation for 
the protection of prenatal life is the inconsistency with which such a law might 
be affected. Indeed, if courts ignore the complex reality and the very architecture 
of the legal protection of life at the prenatal stage of development the law might 
appear to be tainted with several inconsistencies, manifested in many unexpected 
situations.23 This problem is much more important and even more relevant when 
these international courts are strictly bound by an international treaty, so that the 
effectiveness of their decisions requires mediation with a Party-State by the Com-
mittee of Ministers.
22 For a broader context see: J.M. Serrano Ruiz-Calderón, Política de Estado ante el final de 
la vida. La transformación de la deontología médica, Cuadernos de Bioética XXIII (77) 
2012,  pp. 125-135. See also I. Kershaw, Hitler 1936-1945, t II, Barcelona 2000, p. 264.
23 “However, western legal systems have traditionally understood that whereas objects can be 
traded freely, persons, including the human body, its organs and most essential functions, 
cannot be the object of commerce. This means that the freedom of the individual to make 
contracts for mutual benefit is limited.” J. López Guzmán, A. Aparisi Miralles, An ap-
proach to the legal and ethical problem of surrogate motherhood, Cuadernos de Bioética 
XXIII, 2012/2ª, p. 253.
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Indeed various controversial situations might be considered regarding the le-
gal status of the embryo. 
The first consideration is the penalty for abortion as a controversial issue in 
itself. If abortion is not to be penalized, it must be taken into consideration as a 
potential “solution” every time the so-called “indications” occur, or whenever 
there are other circumstances difficult for the mother to handle. Consequently, 
in many countries, including Spain, those “indications” seriously jeopardize the 
value of unborn life.24 Sometimes a decision is taken to suspend the protection of 
a unborn child for a specified period of time. Such an apparent lack of any protec-
tion is considered justified only in the context of abortion. It does not mean that 
the embryo becomes totally unprotected: it is unprotected only against aggressive 
action by his mother, which is considered justified for a number of reasons.
Another controversial situation arises from the truly sadistic absolute availa-
bility of abortion, established de facto in Roe v. Wade, with nuances which indeed 
could be interpreted as a total loss of the child’s individual rights in the prenatal 
phase versus the absolute will of his or her mother not to have a child, or, in a dif-
ferent context, to have children only under certain conditions, or to have a child 
with specific properties.25
The European Court of Human Rights. Costa and Pavan v. Italy
In the Costa and Pavan v. Italy case (application no. 54270/10), the European 
Court of Human Rights held, unanimously, that there had been a violation of Arti-
cle 8 (the right to respect for private and family life) of the European Convention 
on Human Rights. The case concerned an Italian couple who are healthy carriers 
of cystic fibrosis and with the help of medically-assisted procreation by means of 
preimplantation diagnosis (PID), wanted to avoid transmitting the disease to their 
offspring. Italian law prohibits PID. However, it allows IVF for sterile couples 
or those in which the man has a sexually transmissible disease such as HIV or 
hepatitis B and C, to avoid the risk of transmitting the infection. The Court noted 
this inconsistency in Italian law that denied the couple access to embryo screening 
but authorised medically-assisted termination of pregnancy if the foetus showed 
symptoms of the same disease. The Court considered that the applicants’ desire 
24 J.M. Serrano Ruiz-Calderón, Aspectos jurídicos y morales de la despenalización del abor-
to cuando se trata de previsibles anormalidades del feto, Revista General de Legislación y 
Jurisprudencia, Tomo LXXXVIII de al segunda época, Febrero 1984, pp 181-226.
25 About contradiction of this form of abortion and medical awareness see: E. D. Pellegrino, 
The Physician’s Conscience, Conscience Clauses, and Religious Belief: A Catholic Per-
spective, Fordham Urban Law Journal, vol. 30 Issue 1/2002, pp.221, 231. 
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to resort to medically-assisted procreation and PID in order to have a baby that 
would not suffer from cystic fibrosis was a form of expression of their private and 
family life that fell within the scope of Article 8. The fact that the law did not al-
low them to proceed in this manner therefore amounted to an interference with 
their right to respect for their private and family life which was “in accordance 
with the law” and pursued the legitimate aims of protecting morals and the rights 
and freedoms of others, nevertheless it was disproportionate, and thus in breach 
of Article 8.
Preimplantation diagnosis
One of the fundamental aspects of this judgment is recognition of implantation 
diagnosis as a feature of the right to respect for personal and family life, which 
amounts to claim positive obligations of the State, as to provision of access to as-
sisted reproductive techniques.
Thanks to research by Natalia Lopez Moratalla and her team, medical infor-
mation is available which allows for the assessment of preimplantatory diagnosis 
(PID) in its true scientific context and the understanding of the rationale for legis-
lation which, even if eugenic abortion is admitted (as in Italy), still does not permit 
PID, and is associated with assisted reproductive techniques alternative to in vitro 
fertilization (IVF). As Natalia Lopez Moratalla points out, assisted human repro-
duction techniques associated with procedures for the detection of chromosomal 
or genetic defects in embryos in vitro prior to implantation are often claimed to 
have a beneficial potential. First of all, they are presented as an alternative to eu-
genic abortion, secondly as enabling older women to procreate or allowing them 
to avoid pregnancy with chromosomally defective embryos. 
On the other hand, genetic diagnosis before implantation (PGD) and the 
screening of embryos in vitro (PSC), conjures up an image of the disabled person 
as a social outcast. Moreover, it assumes a right to conduct direct human experi-
mentation without therapeutic purposes and enables the manipulation of the em-
bryo that is chosen or discarded according to diagnosis created primarily for the 
advancement of perinatal medicine. Since it deals with numerous embryos, it also 
permits “positive eugenics” that seek to select embryos according to a third-party 
preference as to the sex, or lack of certain genetic irregularities. She considers 
PID an overt form of eugenics sanctioning the destruction of human life in its 
early stages and failing to satisfy the minimum methodological requirements for 
scientific research or biotechnology. 
There have been no previous animal tests to validate the techniques in ques-
tion and this omission is giving rise to serious diagnosis errors. PID ignores evi-
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dence that some discarded embryos can eliminate their detected defects just two 
days after the biopsy. Moreover, the study about what may or may not be diag-
nosed is only retrospective. Last but not least is the fact that there is no certainty 
on the effects that an embryo biopsy may cause to diagnosed embryos, i.e. PID 
gives no warranty that embryos will develop in the correct way after being trans-
ferred to the uterus.26
Contentious elements of the judgment. Hyperactivity of the court
As Bernard Nathanson once said,27 the U.S. Supreme Court’s activism has led to a 
major conflict involving constitutional aspects, by curtailing the legislative power 
in criminal matters and by developing an extremely wide concept of privacy that 
includes sexuality (at least that is my interpretation subject to discussion), which 
must therefore be treated as a priority over the right to life, at least in the pre-
natal phase of life. Its ruling on the Roe v. Wade case, confirmed in many of its 
subsequent verdicts, has effectively straitjacketed the US legislative power, by 
declaring “privacy” a constitutional right28, thereby denying American pro-lifers 
the political instruments to argue their case and preventing Congress from pass-
ing legislation to abolish abortion (despite sporadic attempts to circumvent the 
Supreme Court ruling).29
In the Costa and Pavan case the ECHR has followed a similar course. Once 
again “privacy” has been invoked to construct a previously non-existent right. 
Moreover, the ECHR has ignored the Convention which served as the grounds for 
its own creation, and it has blocked further public discussion like the debate on the 
issue that took place in the Italian parliament in its preparatory work on Law 40.
No one knows who authorized the ECHR in its provisional decision to skip all 
the complex debate on Law 40, playing with creative jurisprudence, and solving 
the political controversy in a sense, on the strength of their own convictions, us-
ing some dubious arguments, but paying no attention to the scientific side of issue 
under consideration.
But, as rightly pointed out by some of the intervenient parties, what is even 
more controversial is that the ECHR disregarded Article 35 § 1 of the Convention 
26 N. López Moratalla, M. Lago Fernandez Purón, E. Santiago, op.cit., pp. 243-258.
27 B. Nathanson, Hand of God: A Journey from Death to Life by The Abortion Doctor Who 
Changed His Mind, Regnery Publishing inc.: Washington DC 2001, p. 177-178.
28 Cf., J. Finnis, The Priority of Persons, Intention and Identity, in: Id., Collected Essays, vol. 
II, Oxford 2011, p. 27.
29 C. D. Forsythe, S. B. Presser, The Tragic Failure of Roe v Wade. Why Abortion Should Be 
Returned to the States, Texas Review Law & Politics, vol. 10 Issue (1 Fall 2005), pp 85-170.
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providing that “referral to the Court in a given situation may only occur after all 
domestic remedies have been exhausted according to the generally recognised 
rules of international law . . .” The complaining party did not exhaust all the legal 
means available at the national level and this clearly reveals an unprecedented 
degree of judicial activism in this case. The European Court of Human Rights 
argued that continuing with domestic remedies certainly would give no effect and 
this belief on the Court’s part appeared to be a sufficient ground for it to disregard 
Article 35 § 1 of the Convention and its earlier case law. 
The European Centre for Law and Justice stated in its submissions: “The ap-
plicant neither can claim to have been affected in any Convention right nor have 
they initiated any action against the Italian judicial authorities: They just claim 
they wanted to have a child after a PID and this wish was denied by the Italian 
State. It certainly seems that the protection system of the European Court of Hu-
man Rights concerning national rights as subsidiary versus the national states is 
abandoned.”30
On the other hand, according to the Court the alleged inconsistency between 
the two Italian rulings – one allowing eugenic abortion and the other prohibiting 
the eugenic selection of embryos, results in disproportionate suffering and thus 
justifies “intrusion” by the Court.
As Frank Cranmer has noted: “The Court considered that the applicants’ de-
sire to use medically-assisted procreation to have a healthy baby was a form of 
expression of their private and family life that fell within the scope of Article 8. 
The fact that the domestic law did not allow them to do so was an interference 
with their rights under Article 8 which was certainly ‘in accordance with the law’ 
and pursued the legitimate aims of protecting morals and the rights and freedoms 
of others.”31
Conclusion 
As I have pointed out, the U.S. Supreme Court‘s activism in Roe v. Wade has 
led to a significant reduction of the power of democratic legislatures in criminal 
matters, preventing them from providing protection for human life at the prenatal 
30 ECLJ, Observations en tierce intervention soumises à la deuxieme section de la Cour eu-
ropéenne des droits de l’homme dans l’affaire Rosetta Costa et Walter Pavan contre l’Italie 
(Requéte n 5470/10). http://eclj.org/pdf/observations-eclj-mpv-cedh-costa-et-pavan-c-ita-
lie.pdf
31 F. Cranmer, Genetic disorders, embryo screening, private and family life and Article 8. 
http://www.lawandreligionuk.com/2012/09/01/genetic-disorders-embryo-screening-pri-
vate-and-family-life-and-article-8/.
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stage. The effect of Costa & Pavan v. Italy is similar. It also uses the concept of 
privacy in order to create a right which is very controversial and has never existed 
before. In effect, it might be argued, that at least some forms of eugenics, have 
been recognized in Europe as human rights protected by the system of the Euro-
pean Convention on Human Rights.
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